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Journal Article

Existence of Nash Equilibria in Finite Extensive Form Games with Imperfect Recall: A Counterexample

Games and Economic Behavior

Authors

  • Wichardt
  • P.

Publication Date

JEL Classification

C72

Key Words

Existence

Imperfect recall

Nash equilibrium

This paper provides an example showing that for finite extensive form games without perfect recall existence of Nash equilibria in behaviour strategies is not guaranteed in general.

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