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Working Paper

The Seniority Structure of Sovereign Debt

Authors

  • Schlegl
  • M.
  • Trebesch
  • C.
  • Wright
  • M.L.

Publication Date

JEL Classification

F3 F4 F5 G1

Key Words

Arrears

IMF

Insolvency

international financial architecture

Official Dept

Pecking Order

Priority

Sovereign bonds

Sovereign default

Related Topics

International Finance

Fiscal Policy & National Budgets

Sovereign governments owe debt to many foreign creditors and can choose which creditors to favor when making payments. This paper documents the de facto seniority structure of sovereign debt using new data on defaults (missed payments or arrears) and creditor losses in debt restructuring (haircuts). We overturn conventional wisdom by showing that official bilateral (government-to-government) debt is junior, or at least not senior, to private sovereign debt such as bank loans and bonds. Private creditors are typically paid first and lose less than bilateral official creditors. We confirm that multilateral institutions like the IMF and World Bank are senior creditors.

Kiel Institute Expert

  • Prof. Dr. Christoph Trebesch
    Research Director

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Subject Dossiers

Research Center

  • International Finance