Skip to main navigation Skip to main content Skip to page footer

30 Jan

2024

Research Seminar

Moral Hazard among the Employed: Evidence from a Regression Discontinuity – Robin Jessen

12:30

 – 

13:30

Kiel Institut für Weltwirtschaft
Kiellinie 66
24105 Kiel

Sprecher

Robin Jessen (RWI – Leibniz Institute for Economic Research)

Abstract

Does unemployment insurance (UI) introduce moral hazard among the employed? We leverage discontinuities in Poland that (quasi-randomly) determine benefit generosity and duration. In addition to reducing exit from unemployment, we find that more generous unemployment insurance significantly increases the hazard that employed workers become unemployed. Workers that enter unemployment because of more generous benefits are essentially identical to the infra-marginal unemployed workers in terms of demographics, education, and history with unemployment.  We extend a model of optimal UI to account for moral hazard among the employed. The results demonstrate that the behavioural distortions of the employed from more generous benefits are substantial. 

Raum

Lecture Hall (A-032)

Kontakt

Verwandte Veranstaltungen

  • 25 Nov

    2026

    Forum Bundesbank

    Wie nehmen Haushalte Inflation wahr und was bedeutet das für die Geldpolitik?

    Kiel Institut für Weltwirtschaft

    Mit Anmeldung

  • 30. Nov  – 

    01. Dez

    2026

    2. Industrial Policy Lab Annual Conference: Industrial Policy in an Age of (Geo)strategic Competition

    KfW Niederlassung Berlin

    Auf Einladung

  • 01 Dez

    2026

    Kiel Research Seminar

    Exposure to violence and prosocial attitudes in war-torn Ukraine – Anastasiia Arbuzova

    Kiel Institut für Weltwirtschaft