Existence of Nash Equilibria in Finite Extensive Form Games with Imperfect Recall: A Counterexample

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Autoren

Wichardt
P.

Erscheinungsdatum

01/2008

JEL Classification

C72

This paper provides an example showing that for finite extensive form games without perfect recall existence of Nash equilibria in behaviour strategies is not guaranteed in general.

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